There’s a bit of “Aside from that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?” in your objection. To me, the pre-existing condition rule, and the mandate that make it possible (if it is posssible) are the only real game-changers in the new law. But I haven’t studied it in any depth, so there may be some bombs buried within.

On the constitutional point, I don’t think that the private purchase mandate changes anything. Think of it as a tax (like Medicare) and a credit (for buying privately) rather than as a mandate and a fine. Same telescope, different end. At least, that’s how it seems to me.

I answer to “Larry.” I blog under my full name so as not to be confused with others.
.-= Lawrence Kramer´s last blog ..Oil Spills and Financial Hemorrhages =-.

We are probably just a few points away on this bill; I like the general idea of expanding healthcare coverage and what have you. It’s just how all the parts have come together that I’m not thrilled about. As I laid out, I’m fearful that many good intentioned pieces, like not denying coverage to those with pre-existing conditions and charging everyone the same premium, will come back to bite our collective ass.

I suppose I misspoke on the constitutionality argument being made; it’s not so much that the government cannot punish you for not doing something, the argument is that the government cannot force you to buy a product from a private company simply for being alive. The parallel would be auto insurance; if you don’t want to buy it, that’s fine, but you’ll be unable to drive legally. Since you can’t exactly stop living (at least, if you want to start back up again later), health insurance is a much different beast.

I’m not sure what happens to the fees collected for non-compliance; my thinking was that they would go to the same place as other tax revenue, that is, to the general budget. I do like the idea of putting that money toward off setting the cost of insuring those who choose to not get insured. Although, I’m still wondering whether a fee that’s capped at 2.5% of AGI will be sufficient to deter people from not getting insurance, as well as providing a sufficient pool of funds to offset the cost of nonpayers.

All of this is in the future, though; hopefully, it’ll be resolved soon and satisfactorily. I imagine that the actual process will be tweaked, twisted, and altered from the process we see being laid out so far, as is always the case with new policies being implemented. I’ll hold my final judgment until I see how it works in practice. (Sidenote: the ‘last blog’ link is to the last blog entry you made at the time of writing the comment; it won’t change.)

After our interesting chat about Dead Peasants, I thought I’d drop by to see what you’re up to. I liked this post. I favor the bill because I think the damage that you mention will not occur. But I’m hardly sure, so we’re probably just a few percentage points apart on the yes/no spectrum. Anyway, excellent job.

I am pretty comfortable with the Constitutionality of the law, but then it will go before the court that decided Bush v. Gore, so, to the extent one believes that court is politically biased, one might worry. There are certainly theories that could be misapplied to make this law unconstitutional. The generic argument that the law imposes a “fine” for “not doing something” is a non-starter. Not paying taxes, for example, will get you a whopping fine.

The mandate is really just a form of Medicare tax – you buy insurance or you pay a tax that is used (at least indirectly, by deterrence) to subsidize your right to buy insurance after you get sick, which, of course, IS a form of insurance.

Actually, that’s a detail I’m not clear on. Mandatory coverage is necessary so that there will not BE any pre-existing conditions – everyone will get covered before they get sick. (Kids don’t count – they can be priced for, as they are not gaming the system). But if the tax proceeds are not made available to the insurance companies, then providing coverage for people after they get sick will be as devastating to the carrier as it is now. The idea, I guess, is that the tax will discourage enough people from waiting until they get sick that actual pre-existing conditions will be insignificantly rare. I would prefer that the tax someone has paid be transferred to the insurance company that is forced to accept him when he finally does get sick. That may sound like a windfall, but state insurance commissioners and employer purchasers are pretty good at turning such things into premium reductions.

[I notice that there is a link below to a blog post that I did on this subject. I'm not sure how that happens, but it's very cool. Now, if you could add a "Preview" button. Enjoy Philadelphia. I lived there for thirty-five years, and I love the place.]
.-= Lawrence Kramer´s last blog ..Healthcare! With an immodest proposal for REALLY fixing it. =-.

This post was mentioned on Twitter by amateurfinance: After much delay and debate, I decided to write a post about health care reform: http://tinyurl.com/yj3luqn...

Thanks!!